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Introduction
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are a critical element of public finance in unitary and federal decentralized countries. In the context of decentralization reforms, their design and implementation has significant impacts on the potential efficiency and equity of basic public service provision. The case of Indonesia's 2001 Big Bang decentralization illustrates the challenges associated with implementing significant reforms to an intergovernmental fiscal system. Almost overnight, local governments were effectively put in charge of almost one-third of consolidated government expenditures (Hofman and Kaiser 2004; 2006; World Bank 2003) . On aggregate, own revenues were only able to finance approximately seven percent of local government expenditures.
How intergovernmental transfers are best allocated across regions in practice continues to be a significant debate in both developed and developing countries.
Indonesia opted to share a particular portion of revenues, most notably from oil & gas, on a derivation basis and introduced a general block transfer for the purpose of equalization. 1 The general block grant (DAU) introduced a formula based equalization grant that considered both relative measures of expenditure needs and fiscal capacities (i.e., own and shared on a derivation basis) to distribute a fixed share of national revenues across all localities (see Annex 1). However, the bulk of transfers were initially based on existing historical expenditure patterns during a transition phase, notably wages, with the fullfledged introduction of the formula envisaged over time. 1 In addition the central government administers property taxes and income taxes that are transferred back to the regions. The distribution arrangement is stipulated in government regulation (PP) Whether fiscal transfers are equalizing has typically been evaluated through two empirical approaches. The first approach assesses the cumulative dispersion in final per capita revenue. This methodology assumes that transfers are equalizing if they progressively reduce the per capita dispersion in overall revenues across the country (i.e., after adding transfers to some measure of own-source revenue capacity and derivation based shared revenues). A fundamental flaw of this approach is that it implicitly assumes that equalizing per capita revenues (and hence overall expenditure capacity) is the central objective. Moreover it may ignore incentive effects of transfers such as fiscal capacity and effort generated at the sub-national level.
The second approach applies the univariate correlation or multivariate regression approaches. These approaches focus on the association between measures of fiscal capacity and expenditure needs proxies and actual per capita transfer allocations.
Equalization is assessed by the degree to which fiscal capacity reduces transfers and expenditure needs (e.g., population, poverty, area, or other socio-economic indicators) increase them. The approach however is sensitive to specification issues pertaining to the choice of selected variables for fiscal capacity and expenditure needs in the model.
Hence, it is not always clear whether evaluations are benchmarking actual allocations against a preferred formula-based benchmark, or they are trying to achieve goodness of fit that explain existing allocations. The more explicit benchmarking approach compares actual allocations to some stated fiscal equalization formula (e.g., as derived from government policy documents) (see also Arze 2005) . But this does not necessarily make explicit likely uncertainty about the right choice of formula.
The motivation of this paper is therefore twofold: First, to provide a more comprehensive methodology for assessing the distribution of intergovernmental transfers.
Second, to provide a corresponding assessment of Indonesia's fiscal equalization to-date.
We advocate the systematic benchmarking of various formula and actual (e.g., due to discretionary or prevailing expenditures) distribution against each other by understanding how different various distributions are (e.g., due to the design of particular formulas, or deviations from formula based allocations owing to any number of policy or overtly political motivations).
The need for fiscal equalization stems from the fact that only the richest subnational governments will typically have enough revenues with some reasonable level of revenue effort to finance a basic set of expenditure responsibilities/needs (e.g., depending on assignments for basic education, health, infrastructure, and administration). Thus the basic challenge for fiscal equalization transfers is to address this gap through the appropriate design and implementation of intergovernmental transfers. Our contribution focuses on the horizontal distribution of fiscal transfers, but not on the total absolute aggregate amount being allocated across all districts. Put differently, given that a country has decided to equalize based on the transfer a certain vertical share of revenues (e.g., as a percentage of revenues or absolute amount), do these fiscal transfers appear to be effectively targeted across individual districts? The approach offers both summary measures of equalization performance, as well as helping identify those localities that are likely to be under-resourced according to some benchmark allocation. 2 We proceed in four sections. Section 2 sets out the main conceptual issues for empirically evaluating the distribution of fiscal equalization transfers. Section 3 describes the main elements of Indonesia's fiscal devolution to-date. Section 4 evaluates the distributional performance and apparent constraints to Indonesia general block grant (DAU). Section 5 concludes.
Fiscal Equalization in Practice
The design and implementation of intergovernmental transfers is a key issue in public finance for both federal and unitary decentralized countries. Owing to economies of scale and historical legacies, higher levels of government will typically control the bulk of the domestic revenue base. Lower levels of government however will generally have relatively higher levels of expenditure responsibilities.
The practical challenge in any intergovernmental setting is to address ensuing vertical imbalances, to allow for revenues and expenditures at each level of government are approximately equal, while averting poor incentive effects. The characteristics of a 2 At the same time we would caution that this empirical approach should not succumb an exercise in "fiscal dentistry" (Bird and Smart 2002) , that crudely seeks to fill the gap between revenue collection and some absolute measure of expenditure needs. It provides one component of a broader approach that incorporates both incentive effects and absorptive capacity when assessing an intergovernmental fiscal system. good transfer system include stability and flexibility. Bird and Smart (2002:901) suggests that the best way of balancing stability in sub-national government revenues and flexibility for the central government is to base transfers upon an overall share of central government revenues (i.e., the vertical share).
A key principle for the horizontal distribution is that transfers do not provide a dis-incentive for mobilizing own revenues. The spirit of equalization from a capacity perspective is to provide each local government with sufficient funds -own-source revenues with similar effort plus transfers -in order to deliver a centrally pre-determined minimum level of services. Consistent with the principles of transparency and accountability, a good transfer system should distribute resources based on a formula rather than on a discretionary or negotiation basis.
Essential ingredients for general transfer formulas are needs, fiscal capacity, and fiscal effort. The determination of needs will depend on the prevailing assignment of functional roles and responsibilities to sub-national governments. For example, primary education is often an important function assigned to sub-national governments. Hence formulas will need to decide whether they take sector-specific indicators of expenditure needs (e.g., school age population), or select generic needs indicators such as population. 3
Generally, expenditure needs will need to be measured by some proxy available for all 3 Education based examples highlight the need to consider the incentive issues in the choice of needs indicators. For example, allocating resources on the basis of school aged population may provide few incentives to increase enrollment to all children or for that matter consider incentives for a better mix of public and private education at a local level.
sub-national entities, given that direct sub-national measures of expenditure needs are too effort and information intensive. 4
The measurement of sub-national fiscal capacity and effort is especially complex.
The main principle here is that transfers to not discourage own revenue efforts. An egregious example includes Russia, where transfers in effect negated extra revenue efforts on the part of sub-national governments (Zhuravskaya 2000) . However, measuring actual capacity and effort may be very information intensive. Formula based allocations need to strike a compromise that, at the very least, does not penalize localities that are collecting revenues at an average representative benchmark of collection. For example, the benchmark could be some function of regional incomes (RGDP). 5
In practice, there may be a significant degree of uncertainty about what the most appropriate distribution of resources would be, given the available data (i.e., design considerations). The choice of formula may also be inherently political, in the sense that it is driven by the extent to which individual players will gain from one type of formulation. 6 Debates about the formula may also be more technical. For example, questions of how to best measure expenditure needs may focus on the treatment of regional cost differentials. As we will see, in a large archipelago such as Indonesia this is significant. Given the distributive bargaining inherent to any transfer design, the lines between technical and political drivers of formula design are likely to be blurred.
Deviations from formula based design may be traced back to a range of motivations. As transfers are increasingly based on a formula, countries may initially wish to institute a hold-harmless condition, consistent with the principle of predictability and stability set out above. If sub-national governments experience too dramatic changes in revenues due to historical patterns in the short to medium term, this may make adjustment costs excessive. Similarly vested interests may capture the process of formula based allocations, for example, to avoid adjustments in existing staffing.
The motivations for the differences between actual and alternative distributions will depend largely on the context. Hence, it is important to understand the drivers of a particular set of options. A pure formula based allocation is often considered as the "ideal." However, the present methodology suggests that the formula-based allocation themselves need to be subject technical scrutiny (e.g., are expenditure needs effectively captured?). To illustrate this point more generally, the paper presents a set of actual (i.e., Indonesia's final block grant allocation for 2006) and alternative (all formula or otherwise) allocations using the methodology below to quantify the magnitude of these trade-offs. Greater targeting mis-specifications across different options need to be flagged for additional policy analysis. The approach also serves to structure a complementary qualitative discussion of the incentive effects surrounding one particular set of transfer distribution scenarios, and how these circumstances impact the efficacy of public expenditures.
Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia
Starting in 2001, Indonesia devolved almost a third of public expenditure to subnational governments, notably its 434 districts (kabupaten/kota) and to a lesser degree 32 provinces. 7 Regions depend heavily on central government transfers to finance the gap between limited own-source revenues (OSR) bases and prevailing expenditure levels. The original 336 localities and 26 provinces in existence at the onset of decentralization have multiplied in number owing to splitting (Fitrani, et al. 2005 ). 8 Aceh received additional revenue sharing. However, these transfers are not calculated as part of its fiscal capacity in the fiscal transfer formula. Neither are the special autonomy funds for Papua.
26 percent (net of shared revenues). 9 Districts are allocated 90 percent of these funds.
The remainder is distributed across provinces. 10 S u l a w e s i T e n g g a r a B a l i K a l im a n t a n S e l a t a n S u l a w e s i T e n g a h Over time, policy makers envisioned increasingly moving to a transparent formula-based allocation (Lewis 2001; World Bank 2003) . The Subscript t indicates total and the subscript i indicates the respective kab/kota. For more details see Annex 1 and Lewis (2002a) Source: Ministry of Finance data. See also Arze (2005) .
The initial challenge for policy makers was to annually increase the prominence of a formula-based allocation relative to legacy allocations for localities, represented by expenditure on civil servant wages and the amount that localities had received in the previous year. Increasing the share of the formula meant that some localities were potentially bound to get less than the previous year. In a series of "hold-harmless" adjustments, those localities which would have received less than the previous year got transfers from those regions that would have benefited the most relative to the last year's DAU allocations. 11
The fiscal gap formula distributes the overall pool of resources available to the regions (net of shared revenues) horizontally by assessing the relative expenditure needs and a proxy for fiscal capacity of each district. Until 2005, the central government used population, area, poverty and cost to measure expenditure needs. The poverty indicators are then replaced by the inverse of Human Development Index (HDI) and GRDP per capita in 2006 (see Table 1 and Annex 1). The hold-harmless clause relative to previous year allocations is to be phased out by
2008.
Changes in the level of the DAU pool leading up to 2006, associated largely with increasing oil prices, at least in the short-term appear to have a more muted impact of the 11 An important development in the second DAU allocation for 2002 was that natural resources had not been included in the fiscal capacity measure of the DAU 2001. Lewis (2002) argues that lack of data can not be an excuse in this case as reasonable estimates of the shared natural resource revenue existed at the time the formula was implemented. Its introduction in 2002 meant that natural resources rich regions would have seen their DAU transfers decrease significantly. Since this was politically untenable, a hold-harmless adjustment was made to guarantee each locality at least the same nominal transfer as the previous year. 12 These include an anticipated salary increase in 2006 (i.e., basic salary increase, family supports and income tax supports), an anticipated functional and structural supports increase, 2.5 % top up, 13 month salary, and an anticipated incoming local civil servants.
composition of "windows" by which fiscal transfers are allocated. The higher and more realistic assumptions of oil & gas prices in the state budget also mean that the anticipated overall pool of the DAU allocated to the regions will experience a 65 percent increase in nominal terms for 2006. 13 These special revenue circumstances mean that the share of DAU allocated on the basis of wages rather than formula will increase only moderately from 40 to 50 percent. The large increase in the DAU pool also means that the The movement of oil price during the fiscal year will not affect the DAU pool and DAU allocation approved by the parliament in the beginning of the fiscal year. It will, however, affect the shared natural resource revenue from oil and gas. In the case of the oil price increase more than 130 percent, the excess amount will be distributed by using the DAU formula (Government Regulation PP 55/2005). 14 Increases in establishment costs for sub-national governments will depend on developments of wages, promotions, and new hires. These will now be subject to a process of monitoring and negotiation between center and decentralized authorities, although it is unclear whether institutional checks will work to restrain wage growth at less or equal than increases in revenues.
approval to hire additional staff. It remains to be seen how effective this re-centralization of the wage bill is, and the extent to which it will ensure that these expenditures match local needs and address any prevailing disparities.
Evaluating Transfer Allocation Scenarios
Various trade-offs inherent in different transfer distributions can be quantified by comparing allocation simulations. Formula-based allocations for fiscal transfers have the advantage of being more transparent and predictable. Such allocations help regional governments plan their expenditure better (Bird and Smart 2002 The notion of a national/centralized civil service was given increased status in the recent revisions of the decentralization laws. Under these revisions, the central government in effect committed itself to finance all civil service expenditures.
Consequently wages now enjoy a priority claim over the DAU, something which is fully What districts received in reality, denoted by the scatted dots, differed quite significantly in many cases from their intended allocations. The advantage of this approach is that it also allows us to pin-point the apparent degree of over and under-financing of a particular locality, potentially allowing for a more systematic follow-up analysis. were applied. Dumai and Samarinda are both located in natural-resource rich region of Riau and East Kalimantan. In turn, localities such as Sarmi and Yahukimo of a lagging province in Papua received only around a half of the "ideal" allocation. Figure 3 implicitly assumes that the formula-based distribution is correct.
However, the design of a formula might be equally open to question. The preference of one formula over another can be based on a range of arguments. The original DAU formula separately measured expenditure needs for population, area, poverty gap, and regional cost levels. For example, Lewis (2002) argued that costs should ideally be used to multiply expenditure needs factor as this actually reflects the spending requirements that need to be adjusted by cost. Others have claimed that poverty should figure more prominently in the distribution of the DAU. The 2006 DAU has dropped the poverty measure in favor of the HDI and per capita GRDP. 18 Table 2 presents a number of plausible allocation scenarios in the policy debate.
Simulation one to four refers to a number of alternatives for expenditure needs formula design. The 2006 formula substituted the Human Development Index (HDI) for the previous poverty gap measures. Simulation three stresses the importance of interregional cost differences in financing services by using the cost index to multiply the population, area, and poverty indicators. Simulation four stresses the poverty gap measure as the sole expenditure needs indicator. All simulations used the 2006 fiscal capacity definitions and keep all other variables as defined in Table 1 . 19 Simulations five to six refer to political or hold-harmless compromises. Option five would allocate all the 18 The rationale is that HDI measures the state of welfare of the people and GRDP per capita measures economic potential and activity of one region (Warta Keuangan, 2 nd Edition 2005). 19 Simulation two uses poverty indicators from DAU 2005 basic data from MoF. DAU based on the distribution of existing bureaucrats, implicitly assuming that DAU can be appropriately distributed based on the present salary distribution (since this implies number and seniority/wage levels). Option six applies a pure 2006 formula, but implements a hold-harmless provision relative to 2005. The last simulation uses population as the sole indicator of expenditure needs, essentially targeting on per capita equalization. In summary, any evaluation of transfer allocations will need to consider the tradeoffs relative to some "ideal" benchmark allocations. At the same time we compare the trade-offs resulting from different methodologies by comparing different formula-based allocations. The practical importance of these trade-offs will be manifested by the size of our trade-off measure. Whereas other characteristics of a transfer will clearly matter for evaluations (e.g., the potential incentive effects of wage based allocations), the magnitude of our disparity measures highlights the degree to which different allocation choice matter in practice. The costs of mis-targeting of intergovernmental transfers can be measured by the extent to which local governments are under-funded relative to those that are overfunded. We can capture the trade-off by moving from one allocation mechanism to the other based on overall level of misallocated transfers (Table 3 ) and statistics that summarizes the individual discrepancies, notably for the under-resourced (Figure 2 & 3 , Table 4 ). In addition to overall mis-targeting, the analysis of fiscal transfer should be concerned with those individual districts that are under-resourced. The mirror image to under-resourced districts, given an overall vertical pool, is the districts that receive too much transfer. Localities where the problem of too little transfers is most chronic would also be those where public services may not be provided owing to an excessive budget constraint, given prevailing expenditure roles & responsibilities. We draw on the poverty literature, and construct a further measure akin to a Foster, Greer and Thorbecke poverty gap index by summarizing the deviations from ideal allocations (in Figure 3 the ratio is 1) for those below 1 (Deaton 1997) :
With (i) being the district, X the ratio, and N the total number of localities. The squared implies a greater weight for outliers, but can be suitably increased or decreased. The smallest differentials are evident between the actual and the fiscal gap formula that uses district wage proportions as the expenditure needs indicator (Table 4 , Figure 4 ). This highlights that wages are already a significant driver of the overall 2006 DAU allocation. But misallocations become more pronounced when comparing to a pure formula allocation with hold-harmless or an allocation using the vintage 2005 formula.
Differences are very large if one believes that population, poverty and a multiplicative cost specifications should be the main drivers for DAU allocations (i.e., the northwest 21 The present measure focuses on the "mis-targeting" of the DAU amount only, although the discussion could also be cast in terms of a district's overall expenditure needs and respective revenues received. The overall resource envelope of a locality can be viewed as presumed own-source revenue capacity (OSR), plus shared revenues (SDA/TAX), plus the DAU. The notional expenditure needs of an individual district (i) can be calculated by allocating the overall pool of revenues available for districts nationally (i.e., OSR+SDA/TAX+DAU) by some relative of expenditure needs. For example, if only population is used, then allocations EN i for each district would be identical on a per capita basis. The measure of overall under or over-resourcing for a district would then be (TOTREV i /EN i ), where TOTREV i are OSR i +SDA/TAX i +DAU i . In the case of OSR i this assumes the notional own revenue capacity (e.g., from regression analysis), and other transfers include actual derivation and block transfers. For reference, this variation was adopted in previous versions for the 2004 DAU and Arze (2005) for 2005. and southeast legs of the diagram). This suggests that careful attention needs to be paid to assessing whether these specific expenditure needs are most likely to be reflective of actual needs, for example through more detailed case studies for district levels.
Differences in the degree of misallocation suggested by the aggregate versus under-resourced weighted ATO measure highlights that individual localities may be particularly hard hit by particular transfer distribution scenarios. Figure 4 suggests that the effect of wage allocation is greater than applying a pure hold-harmless or the old formula based on measure 1. However the effects of the hold-harmless and especially wages are more pronounced if measure 2 is used (compared to just the 2005 formula specification), which emphasized the under-resourced tails of the distribution. The "inverse Robin Hood approach" -taking from the needy to give to the less needy -of these political trade-offs is far more costly for the most deserving (relative to the formula benchmark) than overall. Comparing the actual (northernmost ray in Figure 4b ) to the ideal formula shows that this effect is especially extreme. The design costs for poverty and a multiplicative costs specification are quite close for both measures.
Conclusion
We have argued that the method presented in this paper is more explicit about the benchmark allocations used to assess equalization relative to prevailing approaches that have focused on the final disparities in per capita revenues or correlations to various measures of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. It highlights that intergovernmental fiscal transfer analysis should be explicit about the expenditure needs proxies, fiscal capacity proxies, and their functional form in defining "ideal" allocations. However, it also highlights that while prevailing expenditure assignments (e.g., with emphasis on education and poverty) should guide these choices, applied design should be context specific. However, a more explicit approach is more transparent and open to greater scrutiny.
The explicit comparison of different transfer distributions provides a useful tool for assessing the relative ramifications of different allocation criteria. The first principle is that a formula-based allocation serves as a preferred starting point owing to its advantages of transparency (Bird and Smart 2002) . We identified one type of "misallocation" in the distribution of transfers due to differences in allocations from a formula based benchmark. These examples included differences due to existing wage costs of local bureaucracies and hold-harmless clauses. Our results showed that the policy costs of horizontal misallocations can amount to almost three billion US dollars in the case of the Indonesian DAU.
Given the inevitable absence of perfect information concerning the absolute expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of all individual localities, any allocation formula will necessarily only provide an approximation of the appropriate transfer levels. Our simulation showed that the specification of a preferred formula design matters. In many cases, these design choices mattered more than political trade-offs. Hence, evaluations of fiscal decentralization need to consider both deviations from a formula benchmark, as well as an explicit analysis of the distributions generated by different formula benchmarks.
Regrettably, theory does not always provide a clear guidance on which fiscal transfer formulas are superior. The choice of "ideal" formula need to be driven by (a) the prevailing assignment of expenditure responsibilities and revenue basis, (b) incentive effects inherent in the specification of a particular formula, and (c) available proxy data. 22
The method presented above only provides a means of making the allocational implications of different designs more explicit, at the level of individual localities and overall.
The application of our alternative transfer allocation benchmarking (ATAB) method to Indonesia raised policy implications in three areas: (i) the importance of closer linkages between fiscal and administrative decentralization policies, particular at the level of incentives; (ii) the need to ensure consistency between reforms to general (i.e., DAU) and specific earmarked grant (i.e., DAK) programs, and (iii) the need for improved intergovernmental fiscal reviews on the part of key agencies such as the Ministry of Finance to assess both the vertical (i.e., aggregate) and horizontal (i.e., distributional) allocation of public funds to sub-national governments in Indonesia.
The way in which Indonesia has chosen to organize and finance its civil service potentially has significant drawbacks. Our ATAB simulations showed that growing civil servant salary based allocations in Indonesia lead to growing deviations in actual payments to potential formula based allocations which incorporating expenditure needs and fiscal capacity proxies. Our purely first-order quantitative simulations suggest that misallocations in public resources amount to approximately 2 billion USD (1 percent of projected GDP in 2006). 22 In this paper we have only focused on the potential incentive effects on sub-national revenue mobilization. A broader debate, beyond the scope of this paper, relates to the potential role of fiscal transfers on sub-national economic growth. In some contexts, for example, fiscal equalization may be over-equalizing in that it can have negative incentive effects on economic growth and inter-regional migration more broadly.
Linking fiscal transfers to existing establishment costs will likely be associated with significant incentives towards increasing the cost of the bureaucratic apparatus.
Indonesia's regions are currently benefiting from a windfall due to higher oil prices, which translates into a significant increase in fiscal transfers. The current system clearly drives all regions to negotiate with the center in order to increase their staffing while providing few incentives to rationalize staffing costs. At the same time, the center may not have institutional capacity or accountability to adequately manage and control regional staffing levels in accordance with the national principles of efficiency and equity.
The current system also pays little attention to addressing potential disparities in attracting civil servants to remote regions (cf World Bank 2005) . Wage levels are also in effect centralized, unless localities choose to pay additional salaries outside the basic DAU allocation. The present fiscal transfer incentives provide little impetus or even penalize more flexible and potentially cost-effective local arrangements such as contracting out of school teachers. Moreover districts are being mis-funded without necessarily improving public service delivery outcomes. Given that existing local wage bills have now emerged as the predominant drivers of transfers, additional work is needed to understand how reflective these are of local needs. To what extent do particular localities remain over or under staffed? Further analysis should attempt to more close monitor increases in local salary bills against initial conditions. Comparisons against benchmark allocations can serve as a useful tool to identify outliers for further assessments.
Even as Indonesia's specific grant program remains small, it must be seen as a complement rather than substitute to the general transfer program. Specific transfers (e.g., earmarked or conditional grants) presents a range of particular challenges, and have often tended to perform poorly (Bird and Smart 2002) . There may be an important policy role for specific transfers in Indonesia. Since central ministries continue to control significant sectoral expenditures (e.g., for capital/development expenditures) in devolved sectors such basic education, health, and infrastructure, the DAK channel is often pursued as a potential vehicle to shift these expenditures into the more general intergovernmental fiscal system. Since the regional incidence of deconcentrated sectoral expenditures remains murky, DAKs promise greater transparency and accountability. However, at the same time specific grants instruments such as the DAK cannot serve to fix or offset the problems associated to the general DAU fiscal transfers identified in this analysis. At one level the proliferation of "remedial" DAKs may introduce excessive complexity to the system, while at the same time remaining relative limited in volume vis-à-vis the DAU.
Our analysis is focused on the horizontal distribution of transfers in Indonesia.
Policy debates surrounding the adequacy of vertical and horizontal shares are clearly interdependent for whether Indonesia's regions are over or under-resourced. A larger overall pool may off-set particular horizontal misallocations, but may imply a significant degree of public resources being mis-allocated for over-resourced regions. Our analysis underscored the potential for significant loses due to horizontal misallocations of an intergovernmental transfer such as the DAU. Using a sample of districts, however, the approach can inform more in-depth work to assess whether individual districts along the actual versus formula benchmark distribution receive sufficient absolute levels of fiscal resources given prevailing assignments of roles and expenditure responsibilities. More in-depth sub-national work already suggests that high levels of fiscal resources themselves may fail to ensure better outcomes (World Bank 2005) . In this vein, there is a significant outstanding policy agenda in Indonesia for assessing both the quantity and quality of decentralized revenues and expenditures.
Finally, the preceding analysis suggests that a well designed and transparent (Table 1) . A wage/minimum allocation component continued to ensure that the "inherited" civil services could be resourced. Subsequent allocations sought to reduce this legacy allocation in favour of a fiscal gap formula that encompasses both measures of local expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. However, each allocation has been subject to additional contingency payments and/or adjustments either for transitional purposes or to ensure holding harmless relative to the previous year. . Since realized revenues were higher than budgeted (299.9 versus 263.2 trillion), the total DAU allocation based on actuals rather than budgeted would have been higher. Including adjustments for shared revenues -which appear to have been adjusted slightly upwards for realizations -the DAU based on actual rather than budgeted figures would have been 9 trillion more costly for the center. 25 The original APBN allocation was more than double that at 6.5 trillion, apparently more than sufficient to cover financing short falls. The 2.831 trillion in contingencies were distributed in two batches of 1.1 and 1.7 trillion. Provinces received 1.2 trillion, 0.933 trillion (15) and 0.293 trillion (27). Local governments received 1.6 trillion, 0.173 trillion (15) and 1.431 trillion (219).
Spring of 2001 and unanticipated costs owing to the final regional allocation to civil servants and the new organizations of local governments, and was not allocated on the basis of equalization. 26 Provinces received over a third of the 2001 contingency allocations or about 20 percent of their original DAU allocation, as they often took on "residual" employees that the local governments were unwilling to accept. . Total shared taxes are estimated to add another 24.6 trillion to the regional coffers. The budget also allocated an additional 2.054 Trillion "balancing" fund (dana penyeimbang), which effectively served as a contingency allocation.
5. Finally, allocations differed in five major respects: (i) did not include legacy centerregion INPRES/SDO allocations, but only estimates for actual post-decentralization realized regional wage bills for 2001; (ii) increased the fiscal gap formula component that sought to encompass both fiscal capacity and expenditure needs in fiscal equalization from 20 to 40 percent; (iii) introduced data for shared natural resources taxes (SDA) in the fiscal capacity formula component, 27 (iv) increased the lumpsum component that was equally distributed across regions, (v) the DAU 2002 was ultimately forced to "hold harmless" relative to the DAU 2001 (in part due to the addition to SDA allocations to fiscal capacity), (vi) the DAU was now allocated across more new regions (348 instead of 336) reflecting pressures for regional profusion in the system. 6. To illustrate how the final DAU 2002 amounts were generated, we draw on the local government example, although the process of provinces is similar.
(1). DAUi = PWBAi + LSi + FGAi 7. The lumpsum (LS) is an identical amount for each region. The proportional wage bill allocation (PWBA) for 2002 is based on the actual annualized realized regional wage bill for 2002 (using September 2001 data) . It is proportional in that it does not actually cover each Rupiah of regionally expended wages. The LS and PWBA were collectively referred to as the minimum or basic allocation. The DAU 2002 local government allocations are based 10 % on lumpsum, 50% on proportional wages, and 40% on the formula. The provincial allocation was based on a 20% identical lumpsum allocation across all provinces or local governments, 30% realized wage bill, and 50% formula. The fiscal gap formula amount (FGA) combined measures of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. The formula used regional population, area, poverty gap, and cost index data as proxies for expenditure needs. Fiscal capacity included expected own tax (PAD) 26 With decentralization, local governments were allowed to determine their own organization structure (e.g., dinases, badans, and kantors). Depending on size and local preferences, regions chose more expansive organizational structures and numbers of management positions. The number of management positions (echelons) had a significant bearing on local governments ensuing wage bill. 27 Aceh and Papau were not penalized for their additional natural-resource tax "fiscal capacity" under the 2002 DAU balancing formula component.
revenues, shared taxes (including land and building and personal income tax), and (partial) natural resource revenues SDA.
Lumpsum Allocations
8. The sum of lumpsum allocations were 6.2 trillion for local government and 1.2 trillion for provinces. Local governments were to receive 18.51 billion per local government (or 31,875 per head). Provinces received 46.1 billion per province or 10,063 Rps per capita. The introduction of a lump sum figure creates incentives for the formation of new regions, especially in the case of smaller provinces (Fitrani, et al. 2005 ).
(2). LSi = (LS-weight * Total DAU) / N Proportional Wage Bill Allocation 9. For the proportional wage allocation, 31.1 trillion of the local government and 2.1 trillion of the provincial DAU were allocated by the relative percentage share of each local government or province in the total actual wage bill. The DAU 2002 base data suggests that the total annualized wage bill in 2001 was 40.5 trillion for 336 local governments and 6.6 trillion for 30 provinces.
(3). PWBAi = (Wage Billi/Total Wage Bill) * (Total DAU PWBA)
Fiscal Gap Formula Allocation
10. The fiscal gap formula amount incorporates measures for fiscal capacity and expenditure needs to arrive at an allocation based on fiscal gap (FG i ).
(4). FGi = ENi -FCi 11. Depending on the relationship between the expenditure needs and fiscal capacity indicators, fiscal capacity can be negative. The Indonesian formulation imposed the condition that no region show a negative FG (and hence have STX and SDA transfers reduced).
12.
Fiscal capacity includes estimated own revenues (PAD i * ), realized tax shares (SXT i includes PBB, BPHTB, PPh shares for each region), and 75 % of realized natural resource revenue shares (SDA i ). Own revenues were estimated from a regression of own revenues against region income for manufacturing and services. 28 This formulation seeks to avoid penalizing regions own tax effort that collect more than some average milestone of own revenues (e.g., through varying rates or tax collection effort). 14. The expenditure needs term incorporates an index for regional factors such as population, poverty gap, area, and price levels relative to national averages. 29 The indexes are defined as the regional factors (e.g., POP i ) divided by the national average (e.g., total population). Lewis (2002) rightly points out that this average amount may be too much or too little. Since we can say little about the appropriateness of this overall resource envelope, we simply accept the EN AV factor as given by political decision. The measure used in 2002 was total local government expenditures in 2000 or 169.62 billion Rupiahs per region --available divided by the total number of regions. The choice of this measure is somewhat arbitrary, as arguably an inflation adjusted amount could have been used (e.g., projected PAD, STX, SDA, DAU and other transfers such as DAK). As the main use of this coefficient is scaled by the actual DAU available for the formula window (Eq. 9), differences are not that significant. However, one slight shift would be that a choice of higher average expenditure needs indicators would generated fewer zero or non-zero fiscal gap allocations.
18. However, FC i would have exceeded EN i for 12 local governments, thus generating a negative fiscal gap (and transfer). To avoid this, these negative fiscal gap local governments were set to zero. 31 The overall local government formula amount (FA total ) of 28.4 trillion (40 percent of the local government DAU) was then allocated proportionately based on the share of each local governments fiscal gap. Note that those with a fiscal gap of zero (or previously less) would have received no formula amount under this formulation. In contrast, the remaining local governments received 9.2 trillion more. The working team did have a contingency of 2 trillion to work with, but this was clearly not enough, so clearly some changes to the previous allocations had to be made. 35 Hence the surplus rather -rather than an additional "residual" contingency -was proportionally allocated by each regions share of the overall surplus to fill the remaining gap (i.e., this 31 This increased the implicit fiscal need by Rps. 2 trillion to equal to a total of 44.7 trillion in those respective simulations. 32 Already there was a request that the government do its best to ensure that no region received less in 2002 that in the previous year. The simulations were based on the prevailing DAU ceiling, which differed slightly from the amount that Parliament subsequently approved. 33 The Parliament's objections seemed to contravene Law 22/1999, which prescribes the fiscal balance secretariat to submit a formula to the Regional Autonomy Advisory Board (DPOD), which in turn proposes the distribution of the DAU to the President. The President approves through a Presidential decision (KEPPRES). 34 Actual simulations and data are available on request as STATA procedures. 35 The adjustment for the local governments proceeded in three steps: (i) the hypothetical amounts under the no-harm clause were calculated. For the local governments, this inflated the overall DAU amount from 62.2 to 65.1 trillion; (ii) For the surplus regions, the difference made up by reducing their surplus by their share of the surplus times the deficit (i.e., 2.9 trillion); (iii) The surplus regions were then topped up again by a part of the contingency (1.2 trillion for provinces and 0.855 trillion to the local governments). The contingency was allocated in proportion to the reduction of the DAU of the surplus regions in the first stage (i.e., those that had given up the most DAU were also most compensated by the contingency distribution). meant that the "winners" relative to 2002 also paid the most to make up for the no-harm deficit). 36 21. Except for a different weights assigned to the fiscal capacity component, the 2003, 2004 and 2005 DAU's were essentially allocated along similar principles, although with increasing formula shares and updated data, especially to reflect the growing number of localities in each round 37 . This new "hold harmless" condition has superseded the 2001 hold harmless condition, which guaranteed that no local government received less that the previous routine (SDO) and development (Inpres) earmarked grants. Simulations were always made using the previous years local governments (i.e., 370 for 2004), and the pro-rated to local governments that experienced a split.
Figure A1-DAU 2004: Hold Harmless Winners
DAU 2006: Any Innovations?
23. Effective in 2006, the minimum allocation will now cover the total wage bill instead of proportional wage bill (PWBA) and lump sum (LS). In practice, the allocation for wage will be done first and then the rest of the DAU pool will be distributed based on the fiscal gap formula.
24. The Fiscal Gap formula has undergone some major innovations as well. First the components of fiscal capacity will now be fully weighted; (11) . FCi = PADi * + STXi + SDAi Second, the poverty gap indicator is substituted by an inverse of Human Development Index (HDI) and Gross Regional Domestic Product per capita 38 Please note that if a region has a minus or zero fiscal gap, its DAU 2006 before hold harmless will be equal to its total wage bill. If the amount is bigger than the previous year DAU, the final DAU allocation after the hold harmless adjustment will ultimately be less than the 100 percent of total wage bill. In 2006, for example, regions such as Kabupaten Badung (Bali), Kabupaten Penajem Paser Utara (East Kalimantan) and DKI Jakarta receive DAU less than their total wage bills.
